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Abstract. The paper aims for an improvement of the so-called argument from 
consciousness while focusing on the first-person-perspective as a unique feature 
of consciousness that opens the floor for a theistic explanation. As a side effect of 
knowledge arguments, which are necessary to keep a posterior materialism off 
bounds, the paper proposes an interpretation of divine knowledge as knowledge 
of things rather than knowledge of facts.
I. SeTTING THe STAGe
Some philosophers who have dealt with the argument from consciousness 
have called it a God of the gaps argument.1 Indeed, there is little doubt 
about the fact that the argument from consciousness (AfC) is a version of 
an argument from design. Its aim is, among others, to offer a contrast to 
non-theistic naturalism as it has been presented by Dennett and others.
James P. moreland has re-furnished AfC along the following lines 
(earlier versions of it have been crafted by robert Adams and richard 
Swinburne):2
‘ (1) Genuinely nonphysical mental states exist.
 (2) There is an explanation for the existence of mental states.
 (3) Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation.
 (4) The explanation for the existence of mental states is either a 
  personal or natural scientific explanation.
1 See for example Daniel lim, ‘Zombies, ephiphenomenalism, and Personal 
explanations: A Tension in moreland’s Argument from Consciousness’, eJPr, 3 (2011), 
439-450; see also J.P. moreland, ‘God and the Argument from Consciousness: A response 
to lim’, eJPr, 4 (2012), 243-251.
2 See robert Adams, The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 1987); richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd 
edition (oxford: oxford university Press, 2004).
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 (5) The explanation is not a natural scientific one.
 (6) Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.
 (7) If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.
 (8) Therefore the explanation is theistic.’3
most of moreland’s premises are subject to a number of objections. It is 
not within the scope of this paper to list all of them or to discuss each of 
them in detail. but it is, nevertheless, necessary to point to the most serious 
of them. one of those objections is the rebuttal of the very first premise: 
Physicalists of any denomination would argue that this proposition is 
wrong. And defenders of AfC would have to show that there are, indeed, 
genuinely nonphysical states or facts while mentioning, for example, 
the existence of phenomenal or ‘qualia-entrenched’ consciousness for 
a start. of course, if this is the only cornerstone of the argument it will 
remain open for endless discussions, as we know their parallels from 
the philosophy of mind. And, as Timothy o’Connor and Kevin Kimble 
have underlined recently,4 AfC is in danger of seriously collapsing if one 
could come up with a  purely naturalistic explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness. As a matter of fact, AfC’s effort seems to depend on the 
argument’s premise 1, which is plausible only if everybody will concede 
an explanatory gap between materialism on the one hand and the 
existence of genuinely nonphysical mental states on the other – a gap 
that offers enough space for theistic explanations. but if there are no 
genuinely mental states, the whole business of a non-natural explanation 
becomes rather useless.
This raises the more general question whether or not theism should 
put all its eggs in the basket of a non-physicalistic philosophy of mind 
(the latter phrase may be used to allow for a variety of models beyond the 
fence of eliminativism) and whether or not even a sophisticated God-
of-the-gaps argument is bound to fail eventually. my sub-thesis in this 
paper will be that anyone who wants to come up with a more convincing 
version of AfC needs to move from phenomenal consciousness to 
‘higher’ constituents or, let us call them, ‘performances’ of consciousness: 
3 James Porter moreland, ‘The Argument from Consciousness’, in The Rationality of 
Theism, ed. by Paul Copan and Paul K. moser (london – New York: routledge, 2003), pp. 
204-220 (esp. p. 206). See also James Porter moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of 
God: A Theistic Argument (New York – london: routledge, 2008), p. 37.
4 Cf. Kevin Kimble and Timothy o’ Connor, ‘The Argument from Consciousness 
revisited’, in Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 3, ed. by Jonathan Kvanvig 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2011), pp. 110-141 (esp. 111-117).
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we should think of the experience of moral values or properties or the 
ontological implications of the first person perspective. However, this 
sub-thesis will be presented as some sort of conditional only: If there 
is something about consciousness which has the property X then AfC 
might get off the ground. Still, up to today I don’t really know whether or 
not there is enough evidence for X and whether or not the two instances 
I will refer to deliver sufficient evidence. but even if we look at possible 
flaws right from the start, there is already some consolation available: 
In case the mentioned improvement of AfC might not work at all, any 
defender of AfC still has some options left. o’Connor and Kimble, for 
example, have introduced a prominent one: even within a materialistic 
framework consciousness as a (nevertheless contingent and surprising 
phenomenon) could be taken as a hint towards a refreshed fine-tuning-
argument for the existence of God.5 maybe this is all we can get. but we 
would also have to admit: In getting this, AfC will lose its assumedly 
privileged position and its fascinating quality.
However, in addition to my sub-thesis my main thesis will be that 
AfC’s starting point – phenomenal knowledge and the puzzles of 
consciousness – can be helpful to say something more substantial about 
divine consciousness, at least by some sort of detour. The main inspiration 
is drawn from Yujin Nagasawa’s book6 on knowledge arguments, which 
basically shows that the structures of knowledge arguments, as used in 
the philosophy of mind by Frank Jackson or Thomas Nagel, can be used 
to undermine the notion of divine omniscience if implemented within 
the philosophy of religion. my point will be that michel Tye’s recently 
endorsed strategy to deal with what is called ‘phenomenal consciousness’7 
in circumventing the highly problematic notion of ‘phenomenal 
concepts’ by introducing the difference between knowledge of things and 
knowledge of facts can offer an interesting way out of what we might call 
Nagasawa’s trap. While Tye, as I mentioned before, uses the difference 
between knowledge of things and knowledge of facts, a distinction he 
claims to have borrowed from bertrand russell,8 I  am going to draw 
5 See Kimble – o’Connor, ‘The Argument from Consciousness’, pp. 137-138.
6 Cf. Yujin Nagasawa, God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A  Novel Approach to 
Knowledge Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2008), pp. 3-14.
7 michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts 
(london – Cambridge: mIT Press, 2009).
8 bertrand russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 
1999), pp. 31-40. It is important to note that russell himself talks about knowledge 
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a distinction between knowledge of essences and knowledge of propo-
sitions while trying to get a helping hand from Thomas Aquinas9 and, 
most of all, from John Duns Scotus.10
but let’s return to the outlines of AfC. The main objection points to the 
fact that AfC has some serious problems to get off the ground. Choosing 
the premises to start from is one of its key problems because these 
premises have to prepare for the conclusion that theism offers a better 
explanation to consciousness than naturalism does. let us take a look at 
two key propositions that may be used as starting premises for AfC:
(1) If consciousness has a certain property or feature X, naturalistic 
 explanation is not sufficient.
(2) either theistic or naturalistic explanation is sufficient.
once we transform (2) into
(2*) If a naturalistic explanation isn’t sufficient, then only a theistic 
  explanation suffices
we will arrive at:
(3) If consciousness has a  certain property or feature X, then only 
 a theistic explanation suffices.
recent discussions of AfC have pointed directly to the core problems that 
are necessarily associated with premises (1) and (2): Is there something 
genuine about consciousness, which would exceed the framework of 
naturalism? And what exactly would it mean to say that a naturalistic 
explanation is not sufficient?
II. PHeNomeNAl CoNTeNT
Timothy o’Connor and Kevin Kimble have shown that the best candidate 
for the idea premise (1) is hinting at might be the phenomenal content 
of experience.11 Indeed, at first sight, the gold-coloured view of the Alps 
during sunset as a phenomenal quality seems to be significantly different 
from the functional physical processes that occur in my brain while 
I am watching the bavarian mountainside or that occur as the physical 
and functional substratum of the causal relations between the object 
by acquaintance and knowledge by description.
  9 See eleonore Stump, Aquinas (london – New York: routledge, 2003), pp. 159-187.
10 See richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 59-85.
11 Cf. Kimble – o’ Connor, ‘The Argument from Consciousness’, pp. 111-112.
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in question and my cognitive apparatus on the other side. The various 
problems of phenomenal content have been prominently addressed by 
Frank Jackson’s Mary’s room parable,12 which has enriched the discussion 
of qualitative content ever since. but, in the meantime, certain types of 
materialism tried to convince us that Jackson’s mary doesn’t need to 
be taken as a  rebuttal of physicalism.13 These approaches would agree 
that the apparent differences between phenomenal content on the one 
hand and physical functions or properties on the other might justify the 
impression that there is an epistemological gap. However, they would 
add that this very gap occurs only from an a priori perspective for which, 
along the lines of highly questionable conceivability arguments, a possible 
world is conceivable which reveals the very same physical features as our 
world but has no display of phenomenal states whatsoever. In contrast, 
a posteriori materialism would emphasize that a priori considerations 
remain rather irrelevant when it comes to the scientific explanation of 
consciousness. David Chalmers describes the basic intuition and the 
main strategy of a posteriori materialism as follows:
In particular, this view locates the gap in the relationship between our 
concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, rather 
than in the relationship between physical processes and consciousness 
themselves. [...] Proponents of this strategy argue that phenomenal 
concepts – our concepts of conscious states – have a certain special nature. 
Proponents suggest that given this special nature, it is predictable that 
we will find an explanatory gap between physical processes conceived 
under phenomenal concepts. At the same time, they argue that our 
possession of concepts with this special nature can itself be explained 
in physical terms.14
The key to get away from a priori dualism is the notion of phenomenal 
concepts. but what exactly are phenomenal concepts? Some philoso-
phers, like Christopher Hill15 and brian mclaughlin,16 have argued 
12 Cf. Frank Jackson, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), 127-136.
13 Cf. David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (oxford: oxford university 
Press, 2010), pp. 111-124.
14 Chalmers, Consciousness, p. 305.
15 Christopher S. Hill, Sensations: A  Defense of Type-Materialism (New York: 
Cambridge university Press, 1991).
16 Cf. brian mclaughlin, ‘Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness’, in 
Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Quentin Smith and Aleksander 
Jokic (oxford: oxford university Press, 2003), pp. 97-156.
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that phenomenal and physical concepts play different conceptual roles; 
but these roles do not correspond to different ontological layers of 
reality. others, like brian loar,17 michael Tye,18 or Janet levin,19 regard 
phenomenal concepts as recognitional concepts whose basic aim is to 
help us immediately recognize things without the need of referring to 
background knowledge or any other theoretical knowledge. A third view 
has interpreted phenomenal concepts in analogy to indexicals (John 
Perry,20 John o’Dea21) comparing the prima facie epistemic gap between 
the mental and the physical with those gaps we encounter once we start 
describing a language that makes use of indexicals as opposed to a language 
which lacks indexical expressions. A fourth view (associated with Ned 
block22 or David Papineau23) tried to treat phenomenal concepts as some 
sort of quotational concepts where the phenomenal state plays the role of 
being a mode of representation for either a neuronal state of the brain or 
the physical properties of a given object of experience.24 Thus, defenders 
of AfC would have to show, according to Kimble and o’Connor, that 
these materialist strategies aren’t successful eventually. or, to put it in 
Frank Jackson’s parable, proponents of AfC would have to demonstrate 
that mary, after having left her black-and-white environment, doesn’t 
just learn how to make use of recognitional concepts, or a special kind 
of indexicals, or how to be put into a reference situation that allows the 
use of indirect quotational modes; instead, they need to come up with 
good reasons to say that mary acquires additional knowledge and refers 
to a new set of facts.25
17 Cf. brian loar, ‘Phenomenal States’, Philosophical Perspectives, 4 (1990), 81-108.
18 michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness: A  Representational Theory of the 
Phenomenal Mind (Cambridge: mIT Press, 1995).
19 Cf. Janet levin, ‘What is a  Phenomenal Concept’, in Phenomenal Concepts and 
Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, ed. by T. Alter 
and S. Walter (oxford – New York: oxford university Press, 2007), pp. 87-110.
20 Cf. John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (Cambridge: mIT Press, 2001).
21 See John o’Dea, ‘The Indexical Nature of Sensory Concepts’, in Philosophical 
Papers, 31 (2002), 169-181.
22 Cf. Ned block, ‘Consciousness, Accessibility, and the mesh between Psychology 
and Neuroscience’, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30 (2007), 481-548.
23 Cf. David Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (oxford: oxford university 
Press, 2002).
24 Cf. Chalmers, Consciousness, pp. 309-311; see also Kimble – o’Connor, ‘The 
Argument from Consciousness’, pp. 113-117.
25 Cf. moreland, Consciousness, pp. 42-43.
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A  number of aspects could strengthen the idea that the above-
mentioned treatment of phenomenal concepts doesn’t do justice to their 
intrinsic features we usually describe when we use phenomenological 
methods. For instance, it is hard to explain the special status of 
phenomenal concepts in terms of recognitional concepts since pretty 
much any concept has the capacity to serve as a recognitional concept. 
Take the concept of chair, for example. In a  Van Inwagen world this 
concept’s extension would not be the entity we usually associate with the 
word ‘chair’ but an arbitrary sum of material simples. The notion of chair 
would not be obsolete, however, but it would serve as a  recognitional 
concept only. And in such a world the same would be true for almost 
any everyday concept being related to everyday wholes. Although 
everyday concepts for mesocosmic wholes would have the same status as 
phenomenal concepts, obvious differences remain between these kinds 
of concepts, since the concept of chair, table, computer and the like still 
worked as physical or functional concepts even if they did this job as some 
sort of conceptual abbreviation in a  Van Inwagen world; phenomenal 
concepts, attached for example to colour-expressions or feelings, seem 
to belong to another kind. Additionally there is a significant difference 
between phenomenal concepts and indexicals since the latter’s meaning 
depends crucially and exclusively on the context and, therefore, on the 
person that is using these expressions. In contrast, brian loar’s reference 
to type demonstratives looks pretty much like an illegitimate hybrid 
conceived of concepts and indexicals.
Imagine, for example, that I  have visited the German Parliament 
together with my wife; both of us have admired the chairs and their colour 
(which is reichstags-blue). both of us have had a phenomenal experience 
of reichstags-blue (which is a special colour developed exclusively for 
the furniture of the German Parliament). While anyone would have to 
clarify his or her sentences when using indexical expressions while the 
primary context of their application has changed, I  wouldn’t have to 
do this when I am talking to my wife about reichstags-blue – and not 
just because we were exposed to the same indexical-solidifying context, 
but because we had the very same colour-experience. Thus, for both 
of us there would be no need to replace the colour expressions in the 
sentence ‘reichstags-blue is brighter than royal blue’ with expressions 
like ‘Colour 56 on the X spectrum is more F than Colour 45 on the X 
spectrum’ (with X and F being functional expressions built upon wave 
length, reflection and the like). but, of course this doesn’t show that the 
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concept of reichstags-blue isn’t just a mode of representation, while the 
underlying fact – the dry and sober fact so to speak – is nothing else but 
colour 56 on the X spectrum. Something more needs to be said here.
Coming from this perspective the strategy Kimble and o’Connor 
are proposing has some additional merit because they point at a certain 
tension invoked by phenomenal concept defenders who say that:
(a) a  subject of experience has immediate access to the phenomenal 
content of a  phenomenal property (displayed by a  phenomenal 
experience),
(b) this phenomenal property is actually a physical-functional property,
(c) the very same subject of experience doesn’t have immediate access 
to the property in question as a physical-functional property.26
of course, it is not valid to derive ‘person a is aware of x being Non-F’ 
from ‘a’s being not aware of x being F’. rather, the tension arises from the 
fact that the property in question has, so to speak, hidden features – those 
aspects of its nature that aren’t transparent to consciousness, although 
transparency is the significant feature of phenomenal properties.27 And, 
to say the least, properties like those (that are said to have simultaneously 
open and hidden features) are really puzzling. However, as Kimble and 
o’Connor admit, the puzzle in question presupposes that a  so-called 
doctrine of revelation is sound which says that the intrinsic nature 
of phenomenal properties is revealed to us (in its entirety) while we 
experience this very same property.28 unsurprisingly, the doctrine of 
revelation has been attacked by a posteriori materialists. but even if we 
agreed to doubt its overall validity with regard to phenomenal concepts, 
this doctrine is hard to put aside, since transparency is the key signature 
of phenomenal properties and phenomenal awareness: It isn’t easy to 
believe that the aching pain I  feel has certain features that are hidden 
from immediate awareness since being brought to immediate attention 
is the core ingredient that makes pain a phenomenal concept. but again, 
even if nobody may be puzzled by the notion of hidden aspects there 
still remains, according to Kimble and o’Connor, a difference in content 
between the transparent aspects of a  phenomenal property and its 
assumedly hidden physical-functional nature.
26 Cf. Kimble – o’Connor, ‘Argument from Consciousness’, pp. 118-119.
27 Cf. Kimble – o’Connor, ‘Argument from Consciousness’, p. 120.
28 Cf. Kimble – o’Connor, ‘Argument from Consciousness’, p. 121.
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To benefit from that difference, we have to add a principle of genuine 
content to the picture: let us use the above-mentioned case of reichstags-
blue again. using Hector-Neri Castanedas vocabulary we can simply 
state that the reichstags-blue-guise is very different from the colour-56-
on-the-X spectrum-guise given that guises are the objective content of 
awareness and consciousness. Within my belief-system and, of course, 
behaviourally I  will respond differently to both guises since they are 
related to different language games producing different meanings for 
the phrases in question. but what kind of deeper differences are on 
the very bottom of my different responses to those guises? Kimble and 
o’Connor are focusing on one key feature (but perhaps there are more): 
While phenomenal concepts are simple, physical-functional concepts 
are structured.29 Therefore, it is hard to believe that guises, which differ 
significantly with respect to their genuine content, should constitute 
one and the same property. At this point property dualism (at least 
one version of property dualism) seems to be a more or less reasonable 
metaphysical response to a semantic and epistemological question.
III. AFC moDIFIeD
but what would this result do for AfC? unfortunately, not very much 
at this point. For premises (2*) and (3) require certain features of 
consciousness that exceed natural explanation. but this time it is the 
term ‘natural explanation’ which might undermine AfC. because, as 
Kimble and o’Connor have shown persuasively, as long as we have the 
perspective to come up with fine-grained natural laws which allow us 
to map phenomenal properties to physical-functional properties we 
won’t need a  theistic explanation.30 And isn’t it this hunger that feeds 
any version of AfC? However, if there remains no hunger, the only way 
theism could make use of property dualism would be by some sort of 
fine-tuning argument which basically says that a  universe equipped 
with laws of nature that allow consciousness to arise is quite improbable 
if we don’t take into account the possible intention of a divine creator.31 
If this is the sparse result, AfC as a special kind of argument is gone; 
consciousness is boiled down to an interesting piece of evidence, 
29 Cf. Kimble – o’Connor, ‘Argument from Consciousness’, pp. 126-133.
30 See also oppy, ‘moreland’s Argument’, pp. 200-204.
31 Cf. Kimble – o’Connor, ‘Argument from Consciousness’, pp. 133-140.
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which,  among others, reveals assumedly astonishing qualities of the 
universe we inhabit. may the theistic philosopher take it from here. 
Now, to avoid that AfC changes into some subcase of fine-tuning 
argument three strategies could offer possible solutions, which could 
help strengthening AfC in its very own right.
Strategy 1) could try to propose the idea that lawlike mapping of 
phenomenal properties to physical-functional properties cannot count 
as sufficient explanation since it circumvents an answer to the question 
why the universe is equipped with laws that call for a mapping of the 
different types of properties. A comparable strategy seems to consume 
most parts of moreland’s endeavour of strengthening AfC. To expose 
this strategy also helps us to understand the beef he has with John 
Searle’s32 or Timothy o’Connor’s33 philosophy of mind. While the former 
represents an enriched version of naturalism, the later has endorsed 
and developed a subtle theory of emergence. both of them offer natural 
explanations to the occurrence of consciousness (and its features) tout 
court. moreland, however, would insist that anything less but dualism 
and any explanation of the occurrence of consciousness, which is not 
aiming at dualism, must remain unsatisfying.34 but it is very hard to find 
further evidence in moreland’s writings that would support a reasonable 
move from property dualism to substance dualism and which would, 
therefore, justify to move softly from natural explanations to theistic 
ones. moreland’s sympathies for dualism35 might be more plausible if we 
had access to a world or a situation in which, alluding to a phrase coming 
from Daniel Dennett, some kind of ectoplasmic spiritual stuff that doesn’t 
have ties to physical entities or properties could be encountered. In other 
words, if we could really compete against a posteriori materialism based 
on what we might call a posteriori dualism (based on the experience of 
spiritual stuff), the idea of lawlike mapping sets of properties to other 
sets of properties wouldn’t do the job of explanation because we would 
be confronted with the fact that the realities behind those sets could 
go different, even separate ways. Yet, as long as worlds or situations, 
in which ectoplasmic spiritual stuff is independent of matter, remain 
32 Cf. moreland, Consciousness, pp. 53-69.
33 Cf. moreland, Consciousness, pp. 70-94.
34 Cf. moreland, Consciousness, pp. 51-52, 179-190.
35 For an overview and critique of moreland’s dualistic arguments see Graham 
oppy, ‘Critical Notice of J.P. moreland’s Consciousness and the existence of God’, eJPr, 
3 (2011), 193-212 (pp. 205-211).
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a merely logical possibility, they remain purely fictional and cannot be in 
the scope of natural explanations.
In contrast, strategy 2) could try to narrow down the notions of 
natural explanation to the idea of neo-Darwinian explanation, for which 
change and survival of the species are the core parameters. Although this 
is a promising way since it excludes any form of explanation referring 
to design or a  creator’s intention right from the start,36 appealing to 
phenomenal content alone won’t do the trick if one wants to have good 
reason to say that neo-Darwinian explanations aren’t sufficient. For in 
a neo-Darwinian framework it is still possible to explain the occurrence 
of phenomenal content as a means to increase the chances of survival 
and prosperity for any species equipped with cognitive faculties and 
their biological substratum which allows phenomenal content to occur. 
This is precisely the reason why anyone who is willing to pick up a fight 
with neo-Darwinian theories of non-theistic evolution rather shies away 
from using phenomenal content as a  starting point. Alvin Plantinga 
for example, who has offered an anti-naturalistic argument in different 
versions,37 emphasizes the interesting fact that our cognitive capacities 
are aimed at truth. The desire for truth – as opposed to wishful thinking, 
resilience or self-delusion – may be seen as something that remains 
outside the fence of neo-Darwinian explanations.38 but if we move from 
phenomenal content to the desire for truth in refurnishing AfC, we 
have actually left AfC for the classic alethological argument39 (famously 
proposed by St. Augustine40 and alluded to by St. Anselm). So again, this 
strategy fails in saving the genuine idea of AfC.
eventually strategy 3) will take up the pieces of strategy 2) in order to 
use an entirely different feature of consciousness as a starting point. The 
36 See michael rea, World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2004).
37 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (oxford: oxford university 
Press, 1993). See also Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, 
and Naturalism (oxford: oxford university Press, 2011), pp. 307-350.
38 Cf. for example John Haught, God After Darwin. A Theology of Evolution (boulder: 
Westview Press, 2000).
39 It should be added that the alethological argument in its classical form has certain 
flaws since it seems to foster the idea that God is the truthmaker for everything in 
saying that God and truth are identical. maybe Plantinga’s version, which remodels the 
alethological argument within the framework of a fine-tuning-argument, is the best we 
can get nowadays.
40 Cf. St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, 5-39.
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feature in question, however, must be one that relates almost immediately 
to theistic explanation, i.e. the feature in question must be such that it 
cannot be understood (epistemologically and metaphysically) without 
reference to God. Philosophers within the continental tradition, close to 
German idealism, have pointed to the First-Person-Perspective (FPP) as 
the core aspect of consciousness we are looking for.41 Paradigmatically, 
the argument, which brings this aspect to our attention, runs as follows:
(1) Human consciousness is based and rooted in a FPP.
(2) FPP constitutes the uniqueness of a person’s self-consciousness.
(3) Natural explanations cannot account for uniqueness.
(4) explanations that cannot account for uniqueness are unsatisfying 
in the light of an adequate phenomenology of consciousness.
(5) Natural explanations cannot account for the FPP.
(6) Therefore, natural explanations are unsatisfying.
The phrase ‘uniqueness’ in this case means that an entity is absolutely 
irreplaceable. Well, this sounds somewhat counter-intuitive, because 
we may say that any person is replaceable; there are enough people on 
the planet that could fill in my positions, take up my profession or even 
be the head of my family. but all these things are mere functions and 
roles, which are attached to myself, more or less accidentally. but for the 
unique perspective on the world, which my self represents, I am truly 
unique and irreplaceable.42 If there is something substantially irreducible 
about de-se-sentences it has to do with the uniqueness of the FPP. Given 
that this is a sound circumscription of uniqueness the question remains 
why physical-functional concepts or properties may remain insufficient 
in furnishing an explanation of its origin, extension, constituents or 
phenomenal qualities. Here is, indeed, the sticky part of the argument. 
because any answer would have to lay the foundation for a new version of 
property dualism in emphasizing that the properties that account for the 
uniqueness of ePP are significantly different from physical-functional 
properties. but how so? A response will have to start with the idea that 
physical-functional properties don’t have irreplaceable constituents – quite 
41 Cf. Gunnar Hindrichs, Das Absolute und das Subjekt: Untersuchungen zum 
Verhältnis von Metaphysik und Nachmetaphysik (Frankfurt a.m: Klostermann, 2008), 
pp. 227-249.
42 For an elaborate version of this idea see Geoffrey madell, ‘materialism and the 
First Person’, in Minds and Persons, ed. by Anthony o’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2003), pp. 123-139 (esp. 130-132).
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the opposite: Functions permit perpetuation and repetition, which allows 
the exchange of elements or parts. Another indication to distinguish 
the different aspects of FPP on the one side and functional properties 
on the other could be that any function takes time to process whereas 
the connection between transparent phenomenal experiences and 
a meta-awareness of myself experiencing something occur and coincide 
instantaneously and simultaneously. Still, there are some loose ends in 
this argument. First of all, the notion of being explanatorily unsatisfying 
per se does not entail any indication that a  theistic explanation would 
offer a  solution. Secondly, even if we could move from the fact that 
a natural explanation remains unsatisfying straightforwardly to a theistic 
explanation, one would be curious to see exactly how theistic concepts 
will do their job in explaining the uniqueness of FPP. A conceptual offer 
comes from German idealism again: To Hegel, for instance, it seemed 
metaphysically and epistemologically apparent that God as the absolute 
FPP is the ontological soil any finite FPP is rooted in. If God is seen as 
a principle of omni-subjectivity, he could help explaining the occurrence 
of FPPs in a universe which, taken from its purely physical side, might 
have evolved without any FPP since the laws of nature that have guided 
its evolution cannot account for the origin of FPPs.
but, the mentioned loose ends could still threaten the entire validity 
of AfC. And to successfully tie these ends together might be complicated. 
So, it might be worthwhile to ask whether the uniqueness-approach 
can be strengthened and somewhat simplified. A  promising way is 
Hegel’s combination of self-consciousness and morality,43 which can be 
transformed into the following argument:
(1) Human consciousness is based and rooted in a FPP.
(2) FPP constitutes the uniqueness of a person’s self-consciousness.
(3) The uniqueness of self-consciousness becomes apparent in moral 
experiences.
(4) moral experiences are based on moral properties that aren’t 
identical (maybe not even supervenient) with physical-functional 
properties.
(5) Naturalistic explanations are rigorously related to physical-
functional properties.
(6) Naturalistic explanations aren’t related to moral properties.
43 Cf. Georg W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. by W. bonsiepen (Hamburg: 
meiner, 1988), pp. 395f.
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The crucial premises are apparently (3) and (4). Premise (3) combines 
uniqueness with moral experience. but how so? Hegel, along with other 
traditions, underlines that the experience of moral properties results 
in an awareness of and a call for duty, which picks me as its addressee 
irrevocably. In this case uniqueness is introduced in terms of being 
irrevocably referred to or being irreplaceably called to action. So, it might 
not be too hard to show how premise (3) could be true: Just try to imagine 
being the witness of an accident. To be called to rescue injured people is 
irrevocably addressed to myself even if other persons are available to step 
in. Furthermore, even if they step in for me, this would not take away the 
one single part of the duty that has been addressing me, because there 
isn’t an experience of duty, which is not, at the very same instant, my duty. 
Intuitively, Hegel is right in basing the experience of FPP and uniqueness 
on the experience of duty. Similarly, premise (4) will be quite convincing 
as well, once we consider it impossible to reduce moral properties to 
physical properties, because we have good reasons to claim that moral 
guises are intrinsically and structurally different from physical-functional 
properties. Precisely here is the point where we can make use of the 
lessons we learned previously in emphasizing the doctrine of revelation 
and the principle of genuine content. In this case, the difference becomes 
obvious once we agree that moral properties present something as good 
or desirable while physical properties are aspects or features of what is 
presented as good or desirable. Since the presenting instance and what is 
presented cannot be identical we must not assume that moral properties 
are identical to physical-functional properties. Furthermore, we don’t 
even have the slightest piece of evidence to think that moral properties 
supervene on physical properties, because we can easily imagine 
a world with the very same physical properties realized and instantiated 
but without the display of moral properties tout court. If Hegel’s idea 
is sound, we may have found a way to improve AfC significantly. The 
lessons we have learned in defending phenomenal consciousness against 
a posteriori materialism is still present. However, strategically we have 
moved from consciousness as such to ethical awareness and morality.
but why isn’t this version of AfC not just an argument from morality44 
with some AfC icing on the top? In Hegelian terms the answer would be 
that a naturalistic explanation couldn’t shed any light on the constitution 
44 Cf. Paul Copan, ‘The moral Argument’, in The Rationality of Theism, ed. by Paul 
Copan and Paul moser, pp. 149-174 (esp. 152-153).
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of a FPP, which is the crucial presupposition for the moral realm that 
rests on responsibility and conscience. In other words: The feature that 
allows us to perceive what makes consciousness unique is conscience. 
And this is something that goes beyond qualitative experiences but is, 
nevertheless, related to them. Additionally, a  Hegelian version of AfC 
will be more than another variation of fine-tuning arguments if we have 
evidence that for any conscience-gifted FPP we need to postulate a more 
or less immediate participation in – what Hegel calls – the absolute. At 
this point we can offer, at least, a conditional to save AfC as a genuine 
argument: If conscience as a characteristic feature of consciousness (in 
its overall ethical and intellectual aspects) offers a unique quality, which 
cannot be understood correctly if the conscience’s perspective isn’t rooted 
in an ‘absolute’ dimension, a non-theistic ‘explanation’ of consciousness 
won’t suffice.
IV. CoNSCIouSNeSS AND DIVINe CoNSCIouSNeSS
That there might be a  chance to improve AfC is not exclusively good 
news for the theist if any improvement is based on knowledge arguments 
in the long run, because at this very point one could get pushed into 
Nagasawa’s trap, which in a more detailed but still condensed version can 
be circumscribed as follows:45
(1) The acquisition of certain concepts C implies gaining knowledge; 
and the lack of certain concepts C implies a  lack of certain 
knowledge.
(2) There is at least one situation in which a  rational being a  lacks 
certain concepts (because of a situation or context S).
(3) There is at least one situation in which a  rational being a  lacks 
certain knowledge.
At first glance, (3) doesn’t seem to be a huge problem. However, if we should 
have a reason to think that God lacks certain concepts humans do have 
(atheistic philosophers like michael martin46 have introduced the concept 
of envy or fear, because it seems in order to understand these concepts 
you need to have had the real experience of envy or fear), he would lack 
45 Cf. Nagasawa, God and Phenomenal Consciousness, pp. 120-122.
46 Cf. michael martin, ‘Conflicts between the Divine Attributes’, in The Impossibility 
of God, ed. by m. martin and r. monnier (Amherst – New York: Prometheus, 2003), 
pp. 242-257.
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certain knowledge as well. And therefore God wouldn’t be omniscient. 
The theist is confronted with some kind of dilemma: In case AfC works 
(despite the above-mentioned problems and challenges), it originates from 
a  knowledge argument whose structure could backfire and undermine 
classic theism, at least certain constituents of classic theism. If AfC does 
not work, however, the theist would not have to face this particular danger 
at that point but he might nevertheless lose a  good piece of evidence 
in favour of God’s existence. So, is it wise to shy away from knowledge 
arguments as such in order to save divine omniscience eventually?
It is interesting to notice that from within the philosophy of mind we 
may get a helping hand for escaping this very problem, i.e. the first horn of 
the dilemma. In his recent book michael Tye has expressed dissatisfaction 
with the idea of phenomenal concepts. For phenomenal concepts won’t 
help the a posteriori materialist explain the special aspects and features 
of phenomenal experiences, because as concepts they don’t stick out.47 
Phenomenal concepts according to Tye are, like other concepts, open 
to reference confusion and concept sharing. For example, in applying 
a concept to a given phenomenal experience we may be insecure which 
concept to pick if the situation is complex.48 And, on the other hand, we can 
use the phenomenal concepts we have to discuss certain problems with 
someone who may not have had a certain colour experience but who may 
know from books and who may have learned from third person testimony 
that, for example, the colour of German post offices is yellow.49 Tye’s very 
own solution is to abandon the idea of phenomenal concepts as a means 
to approach what seems to be special about qualitative content. Instead, 
he turns to an interesting distinction inside the concept of knowledge, 
making a difference between knowing facts and knowing things (which 
Tye equals with knowledge by acquaintance). Frank Jackson’s mary in 
this perspective would be a person that knows all the relevant physical 
facts about colours but who lacks phenomenal experience and, therefore, 
lacks certain knowledge of things:
There is a kind of knowledge of the color of red that is not given to us 
by our knowledge of all the relevant physical facts. The knowledge we 
get by acquaintance. There is a kind of knowledge of the color red that 
is not given to us by our knowledge of all the relevant physical facts. The 
47 Tye, Consciousness Revisited, p. 56.
48 Cf. Tye, Consciousness Revisited, p. 45.
49 Cf. Tye, Consciousness Revisited, pp. 63-69.
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knowledge we get by acquaintance with red is logically independent of 
our knowledge of truths. Indeed, it is physically possible for someone 
(for example, mary in her black-and-white-room) to know all the 
physical facts pertaining to the experience of red and not know red (in 
the relevant sense of ‘know’). Thus, knowing the relevant facts does not 
in itself enable us to know red rather than green.50
Addressing the idea of knowing things versus knowing facts could be 
Tye’s version of having the cake and eating it, too. because in the light 
of Tye’s distinction Frank Jackson’s poor mary appears to be, let’s use 
Nagasawa’s phrase,51 (only) prima facie omniscient with regard to the 
facts one could know about colours. Nevertheless, according to Tye, 
mary lacks a certain knowledge of things (which is the access mode we 
are in whenever we have a colour experience).52 So, mary’s knowledge 
wasn’t perfect to begin with.53 Although it parts ways with what Tye 
said about mary’s case, it sounds just right if we suppose that ultimately 
knowledge of facts must be rooted in knowledge of things. Therefore, 
we can as well say that mary isn’t ultima facie omniscient, even if we can 
admit that she doesn’t gain knowledge of facts after her release.
but how could mary’s situation help us in escaping what I  have 
called the Nagasawa trap? For some philosophers God’s apparent lack of 
knowing how it is to be me (according to Grim) or how it is to feel envy 
(according to martin) puts a serious threat to divine omniscience. While 
Nagasawa holds that God could be held responsible for omniscience 
deficits only if it ever were within his epistemic powers to know such 
truths,54 so that in the end neither Grim nor martin would have the 
epistemic right to put God on trial, I  would like to propose the idea 
that whatever they call a  lack of knowledge is measured against the 
rather imperfect standards of propositional knowledge (a  term which 
I  want to use to broaden Tye’s notion of knowledge of facts). Indeed, 
there are good reasons to think that divine consciousness performs its 
cognitive powers predominantly, if not exclusively, as the knowledge of 
things. Theologically – and this may turn Tye’s conceptual distinction 
from heads to tails – it is sound to think that knowledge of things is 
50 Tye, Consciousness Revisited, p. 139.
51 Cf. Nagasawa, God and Phenomenal Consciousness, p. 120.
52 Cf. Tye, Consciousness Revisited, p. 119.
53 Cf. Nagasawa, God and Phenomenal Consciousness, pp. 125-128.
54 Cf. Nagasawa, God and Phenomenal Consciousness, pp. 21-23 and 58-73.
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superior to knowledge of propositions and that an ultimately perfect and 
eternal being has simultaneous knowledge of things with knowledge of 
facts being a surrogate only for those beings that exist in time and are 
therefore bound to memory, derivation and inference.
Now, what are the benefits of this view? Any omniscience as well 
as any foreknowledge problem seems to arise from the notion of 
propositional knowledge. Questions like whether or not God knew 
yesterday that I am wearing a necktie today are tied to the concept of 
propositional knowledge. We can undermine this kind of questions and 
their paradoxical if not dialectical answers if we assume that God doesn’t 
have propositional knowledge (at least not primarily or not in the ways 
in which we have propositional knowledge). especially foreknowledge 
problems are crucially linked to propositions and get sharpened by 
necessity-expressions. So, if we had reasons to say that divine knowledge 
is not appropriately, at least not fully captured by expressions of 
propositional knowledge we might see a way to avoid theistic fatalism. 
The problem of theistic fatalism arises from a conditional: If God (now 
or eternally) knows that p will occur tomorrow, then the occurrence of p 
cannot be within the range of an open future, i.e. within the range of 
significant freedom which would have the capacity to bring about non-p. 
but what if God, once we take the phrases literally, does not know that p 
will occur but rather has some sort of knowledge by acquaintance of 
what the substance behind p is? If the latter were true, we would have 
no reason to say that God’s infallible knowledge of facts causes an event 
to occur since knowledge by acquaintance is meant to be a specific sort 
of accompanying, non-inferential knowledge, which per se cannot have 
any causal effect.
This idea, however, may not be easy to accept; and some will ask if we 
have reasons to assume that God doesn’t have propositional knowledge 
(at least not primarily) and how God performs any cognitive activity. For 
the outline of an answer we will find some precious hints in Aquinas to 
support the idea of a primary and specifically divine knowledge of things 
(a term that shall be used to describe the ontological side of a knowledge 
of things). To Aquinas discursive knowledge (which is the result of 
propositional knowledge) would destroy divine simplicity because in 
knowing propositions there would be parts within divine knowledge.55 
Furthermore, propositional knowledge includes knowledge gained 
55 Cf. Aquinas, S.Th. I q. 14 a 7.
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by inferring and deriving conclusions, whereas divine knowledge 
is absolutely immediate and, so to speak, basic. The closest notion of 
knowledge that could ever fulfil the standards of divine simplicity is 
knowledge of things. According to bertrand russell’s famous definition 
there are situations in which knowledge of things is as immediate 
as exhaustive, although it seems to be non-conceptual (or, at least, 
pre-conceptual) and non-derivative.56 of course, we may wonder how 
divine knowledge of things can keep divine simplicity intact although 
there is a plurality of things or substances in this universe. The answer 
to that question is a  common denominator of medieval philosophy: 
the primary thing God is acquainted with is his very own essence.57 
Therefore, divine knowledge is superior, perfect, instantaneous and 
complete, for within the knowledge of his very own essence he knows 
everything else (taken literally: every-thing else) by acquaintance. 
Admittedly it is not easy to even get a glimpse of this mode of knowing. 
Aquinas offers an interesting model which shall be extended and given 
the form of a  thought experiment: Imagine yourself as being some 
kind of advanced mystic. After years of exercise and training you have 
the unique experience of being at the very centre of everything while 
experiencing no passage of time (within yourself) and no unbridgeable 
distances in space any longer. Nevertheless you would still be able to see 
the differences of things you are acquainted with in this instantaneous 
experience. but the point of reference for measuring any difference and 
diversity would be you as the very centre of this experience. Comparably, 
God perceives in an instantaneous mode, in an unsurpassable ‘now’ the 
diversity and difference of things as they appear through the lenses of his 
very essence.58 If God has propositional knowledge, the only adequate 
concept he could use would be the non-exhaustive concept of his own 
essence – with the essence of things filtered through the knowledge of 
his own essence. but how could this avoid fatalism? A first response says 
that the modus-ponens-result, which derives the necessity of an event 
from divine infallibility, cannot be correct, given that the conceptual 
56 Cf. russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 31.
57 Cf. Aquinas, S.Th. I q. 14. a. 4-6.
58 I also assume that this could be one way to make sense of linda Zagzebski’s fascinating 
idea of divine omnisubjectivity which she has introduced to make individual De-se-
knowledge accessible for the divine knower. See linda Zagzebski, ‘omnisubjectivity’, 
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, ed. by Jonathan Kvanvig (oxford: oxford 
university, 2008), pp. 231-247.
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form of the conditional, which expresses knowledge of facts, isn’t a valid 
depiction of the divine state of knowledge. Thus, the transfer of necessity 
from the antecedent to the subsequent part of the conditional needs not 
to be accepted. but isn’t there anything more to say about the state of 
divine knowledge apart from the above-mentioned negative answer that 
pointed to possible failures in conceptualizing divine knowledge?
Perhaps John Duns Scotus’s exposition of the problem will shed 
some additional light; in accordance with Aquinas and others Scotus 
agrees that the divine essence is the primary thing God is acquainted 
with. It is as primary for him as God’s being is the ultimate goal for 
every human action. And in analogy to the fact that the presence of 
God’s being as the ultimate goal in every human action does not disturb 
humans in directing their will to finite things, God’s knowledge of 
things isn’t disturbed by knowing his very own essence as the primary 
object.59 Furthermore, within the divine essence the finite beings are 
presented60 while this presence relates them to divine infinity61 so that 
this very infinity shapes their finitude62 and therefore their being distinct 
from God.63 Scotus insists that God knows individual substances by 
acquaintance. but since individual substances are finite and seated in 
space and time, they are present to an eternal God in their (what we may 
call) counterparts,64 which are their individual essences.65 However, this 
doesn’t make the individual substances eternal. Having their essences 
as eternal counterparts is just the mode of their being presented to and 
known by an eternal God.66
However, this is the point where Scotus parts ways with Aquinas and 
the boethian idea of eternity. For Scotus the future cannot be simply 
present and, therefore, cannot be an equivalent relatum of the eternal 
now, which is God’s very own privileged point of view. Since eternal 
co-presence presupposes that both sides of the relation are actual, God 
cannot be co-present with future events.67 What sounds like Scotus’s 
59 Cf. John Duns Scotus, ord. I, Dist. 35, q. unica, n. 29.30.
60 Cf. John Duns Scotus, ord. I, Dist. 35, q. unica, n. 14.15.
61 Cf. John Duns Scotus, ord. I, Dist. 35, q. unica, n. 32.
62 Cf. John Duns Scotus, ord. I, Dist. 35, q. unica, n. 16.17.20.
63 Cf. John Duns Scotus, ord. I, Dist. 35, q. unica, n. 26.
64 Cf. John Duns Scotus, ord. I, Dist. 35, q. unica, n. 44.45.
65 Cf. John Duns Scotus, ord. I, Dist. 35, q. unica, n. 31.32.
66 Cf. John Duns Scotus, lect. I, Dist. 36, q. unica, n. 22.
67 For a substantial analysis see Pascal massie, ‘Time and Contingence in Duns Scotus’, 
in The Saint Anselm Journal, 3 (2006), 17-31.
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appreciation of some form of presentism turns out to be a sophisticated 
alternative to a  temptation created by the boethius-Aquinas way of 
interpreting divine eternity, a  temptation that consists in making 
contingent entities or events somehow eternal before God’s point of 
view. For Scotus, time is not like a frozen circle around a centre, which 
is God’s perspective. rather it resembles a  moving flow in the shape 
of a circle around the divinely immovable spot.68 God is not subject to 
time; but the order of time is relevant to him in his very own eternal co-
presence. Thus, what is necessary and eternal is seen by the divine mind 
as an uninterrupted pattern in a, let us use this somewhat problematic 
analogy, panoramic visual field, while contingent things are changing, 
often interrupted and yet related patterns which aren’t by any means 
continuous appearances in this field.69 Avoiding the danger of making 
contingent entities eternal, Scotus emphasizes that future contingents 
aren’t predominantly presented to the divine intellect, which (as any) 
intellect refers to what is given, i.e. actual. So, it is the divine will that 
relates to future contingents, making them determinate.70 And future 
contingents are ontologically present to the divine will as intentional 
objects. The key mistake of theistic fatalism, in Scotus’s view, is to treat 
future events as a given to a past state of divine knowledge. but future 
events aren’t a given since they are not actual (nevertheless as potentials 
they are in some way existing and can serve as intentional objects). And, 
additionally, there is no past stage of divine knowledge, since God is not 
subject to time but present to himself in an eternal now. 
but how does this idea refer back to the predominance of the 
knowledge of things? Didn’t we talk of future events although we tried to 
get away from any expressions that pictured divine knowledge in terms 
of knowing facts? maybe the final story can be told like this: In their 
essences individual things and their changes are to be cognized as centres 
for patterns of properties with potential properties (as intentional parts) 
replaced by actual properties – a replacement which depicts the order 
of time and temporal change in the tenseless view of divine eternity. 
Whereas, in our tensed view those properties are the truthmakers of facts 
or are the potential truthmakers of future events. Since we do not have 
a  divine perspective, the continuance of a  thing enduring its changes 
68 Cf. John Duns Scotus, lect. I, Dist. 39, qq. 1-5, n. 85-87.
69 Cf. John Duns Scotus, lect. I, Dist. 39, qq. 1-5, n. 65.
70 Cf. John Duns Scotus, lect. I, Dist. 39, qq. 1-5, n. 64.
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comes to us as some abstraction. For God, however, the essences of things 
are the immediate objects of his privileged knowledge. If God should 
have further knowledge of propositions in addition to the knowledge 
of things, this propositional knowledge has to be conceptually different 
from our propositional knowledge (since God sees everything through 
the lenses of his essence) and, to say the least, must transform tensed 
propositions into tenseless ones (at least many medieval theologians 
voted for such a transformation).
but what can this picture of divine knowledge do for the Nagasawa 
problem? omniscience, defined in accordance with so-called knowledge 
arguments, seems to be related to the set of all true propositions. 
Indeed, if divine knowledge were of that kind, even one element missed 
by divine knowledge would raise the suspicion that God is seriously 
lacking omniscience. Instead of discussing whether or not God’s 
omniscience could survive if it were related to only a subset of all true 
propositions, medieval philosophers have painted another picture: at the 
backside of the set of all propositions there is the set of all actual (and 
possible) individuals through their essences. In knowing all essences 
by acquaintance God knows everything there is to know even though 
he doesn’t have the propositional knowledge we have. In other words: 
God looks at the universe in a very different way. recalling theological 
traditions we have reason to think that his knowledge by acquaintance is 
way superior to our modes of knowing, while propositional knowledge 
is needed where immediate access is lost or the simplicity of the state 
of knowing cannot be granted. one indicator that helps us to subscribe 
to this view is that knowledge by acquaintance is immediate, whereas 
propositional knowledge is not. Another one would be to say that 
propositional knowledge cannot really grasp the individuality of 
individual substances since for propositional knowledge individuals 
appear to be instances of universals (with propositions being the offspring 
of universals), while within divine knowledge individual essences are 
grasped in their individuality, since they aren’t perceived as cases of 
something universal, because they are measured by the standards of the 
divine essence, which is the instance of pure singularity.
V. CoNCluSIoN
Now with this emphasis on the difference between knowing things 
and knowing propositions we may eventually have to deal with the 
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question whether we have undermined AfC completely. As it appears 
the theologically speculative idea of divine knowledge was built upon 
the graveyard of knowledge arguments. Do I  have to bury AfC once 
we move away from the premises of knowledge arguments as such? 
Well, this might not be the last word here. looking at the philosophy 
of consciousness from a  distance, anyone will notice certain cycles of 
loading off problems; eventually the dualism of facts and concepts was 
pushed to the duality of knowing facts and knowing things. And as long 
as there is some duality at work we will always have the space to come up 
with conceivability arguments. In this case we should wonder whether 
or not there is a possible world in which people have knowledge of facts 
without knowledge of things. If knowledge of facts is necessarily rooted 
in knowledge of things we would be forced to imagine something truly 
impossible. but maybe there is no necessary connection (at least we can 
think of God being a  very prominent exemption) so that the natural 
connections between knowledge of facts and knowledge of things are 
typical for human beings and animals inhabiting the actual world. 
based on this assumption we can imagine a world without knowledge of 
things. Any form of cognitive processing would be somehow derivative 
and mediated through certain detour calculations. A  world like that 
would resemble a  robot world presenting an encyclopedia of (true) 
propositions without having ever touched the ground of knowing things. 
but what exactly makes the difference between this world and our world 
where knowledge of things is not an unusual though sometimes rare 
access-mode? There are some reasons to believe that the First-Person-
Perspective makes the difference since this perspective seems to be at 
the very bottom of knowing things since it is the ultimate role-model of 
knowing things.71 If we could come up with further reasons to believe 
that FPP is the ultimate instantiation or even the prerequisite for the 
knowledge of things, we could start the engine of AfC again.72
71 Cf. russell, Problems of Philosophy, p. 34.
72 Acknowledgment: This paper was originally presented in munich, at a conference 
for the Analytic Theology Project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation.
